http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=9482
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01.11.2001
Afghanistan vs. USA - Not Too Much to Talk About

By Yaroslav Razumov

Analyzing the history of military-political conflicts in Afghanistan, where international sides participated results in tracing a number of patterns. At least within the last century and a half these conflicts had the same scenario.

Invasions normally began against the background of internal fights, which at the time had already split Afghanistan. It was especially so during the second Anglo-Afghani war in 1878-1880, the Soviet troops foray in 1929, and certainly within 1979-1989. The external forces, as a rule, attempted not to intensify the inner Afghanistan mutiny, but rather to take advantage of the latter and to force a kind of order in the country beneficial to them, and to further stabilize it. However no one managed to succeed in that. A natural ethnic and regional rift of the Afghanis, the mentality of the people, who on the one hand got used to war, and on the other, had not been spoilt by the material wealth and modern comfort predetermined the lengthiness of the conflicts and the country's instability. Neither England, nor Soviet Union managed to enforce their domination in Afghanistan, and even not because they faced a serious military rival (this happened in other world regions, where sooner or later Moscow and London solved the problem), but rather due to a specific internal political situation in Afghanistan. The traditional ways to impose influence did not prove efficient there. Bribing the elite did not work, as there were too many of them, and their interests often contradicted, i.e. when the external players bribed a party, it resulted in a conflict. A military intervention did not prove to be a 100% reliable tool, although it helped to achieve a certain success.

External factors influenced the situation in Afghanistan as well: bordering the zone of interests first of the Russian and British empires, and then of the USSR and the USA, Afghanistan reluctantly found itself in the midst of their geopolitical ambitions, which certainly intensified the internal revolt, and did not give a chance to neither external force to dominate in the region.

Inspite of the multiple changes, these days the geopolitical situation in Afghanistan is nearly the same. Its major developments stayed as they had been in the 19th-20th centuries - the society rift, a number of rivaling political forces that rely on the foreign support, a poor but well experienced in war people, a clash of the major powers' interests. Moreover, some of the factors undermining the situation in Afghanistan got even worse. For example, now it is not just the interests of two countries that collide there, but of quite a few. Besides the traditional players - Russia (the Russian empire's and the USSR's interests inheritor) and the USA (which took over from the UK), there are also Iran, Pakistan, various international Islamic forces, China, and to some extent India and the Trans Asian post-Soviet republics. Therefore, the USA would have to cope with a situation, which in a political sense is even more complicated than the ones the other belligerent nations had run into in Afghanistan. The superpower status, as well as the military and economic power might help to get control over Afghanistan to a certain extent only.

Moreover, the historic experience shows that no external force can fully control Afghanistan: there are too many players in the internal political arena, and too many external ones, willing to take part in the process; so no nation can claim itself to be a predominant power here. In theory one might suggest that the US and their allies could defeat the Taliban in the military operation by firstly dividing them from inside, and then by planting a loyal government in Kabul and supporting it by a large-scale economic and military-technical assistance. There have been similar patterns, e.g. Najibulla's pro-Soviet government in the aftermath of the USSR troops withdrawal and prior to its fall. However, firstly the Afghanistan conditions require a great scope of assistance, comparable even to that of Israel and Egypt - traditional leaders among countries donated by America. Secondly, there is practically no guarantee the result would be achieved.

Thirdly, history shows that however mighty the Kabul regime was, it could not possibly control the whole Afghanistan. This happened under the British; also within the relatively calm 30s-60s of the last century (a few remember that late Masud began his fight in Panjsher even before the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan), the same was during and after the Soviet occupation.

I.e., the players in this political game may switch places - ones would rely on the American support, sit in Kabul, and call themselves "a formal" power in the country, while others, supported by Iran, radical Islamic organizations, and possibly Russia and China would not recognize this power, and go on fighting. The everlasting situation would repeat itself all over again.

An external power might turn the Afghanistan political situation to its benefit if not by fully controlling the state of the country, then by domineering there, forcing a direct military involvement in the Afghanistan internal conflict. To achieve that one must forget about air bombing or small Special Forces groups' operations, however successful they might be, and concentrate rather on a full scale land operation on a major, if not whole, territory of Afghanistan. And of course the operation should be a success. In its course the American troops joined by their Afghani allies should gain control over Kabul and major regional centers, place loyal authorities there, provide them with not only technical and economic assistance, but also with the American troops support. Which means to reproduce a 1979 situation, initiated by the Soviet Union. Would that be possible? Clearly, not. However, one should research the matter carefully before evaluating how the Afghanistan situation would develop.

The majority of experts say, the land invasion by the US troops is doomed, as all foreign powers failed to succeed in doing so. This is not exactly true. The foreign armies did gain success in Afghanistan. English troops managed to occupy a significant piece of Afghanistan, including Kabul during the 2nd Anglo-Afghani war. Only afterwards, due to a number of military and political mistakes they suffered a few heavy losses.

In the spring of 1929 the USSR took advantage of yet another mutiny in Afghanistan. The Soviet expedition corps, heavily supported by air force and artillery, quickly took Mazari-Sharif and was successfully advancing towards Kabul. Probably only a situation change in Afghanistan, which resulted in a futility of a further campaign advance, saved the Afghanistan capital from seizure - the Soviet troops withdrew from the country.

Opposite to a widespread opinion, the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan was not negative for the USSR from the military standpoint: the army didn't lose a single major battle, forced a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, and suffered losses much less than those the US faced during the similar campaigns in Vietnam and Korea (15,000 Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, over a 100 thousand Americans lost in Korea, tens of thousands American casualties in Vietnam; the USSR lost much less military gear, as well). Besides, the USSR managed to provide a rather firm position for Najibulla's regime. Correct, the latter did not enjoy a full-scale control over Afghanistan, however no one had ever done that. Plus since yet the spring of 1985 the USSR land forces switched from the active combat towards supporting their Afghani allies, since the fall of 1986 the Soviet Union began withdrawing its troops, and in February 1989 the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. And even after that a Soviet puppet Najibulla stayed in power for over three years. This proves our two statements: first, that foreign troops may succeed in Afghanistan in case the right strategy is used, and second, that only a large scale military invasion could ensure a loyal political regime in Afghanistan, but then one should be ready to assist the regime economically and to suffer multiple casualties. Both are problematic for the Americans, as their society is used to the examples of bloodless (for the US) military campaigns, when the American troops crush the enemy using their air force and missile superiority, as in Iraq and Yugoslavia. As soon as the US army suffers relatively significant losses (like in Somali), the society protests. None of such campaigns within the last decades was successful for the US.

There is almost no chance the US would go for a large-scale land invasion in Afghanistan. And if they don't, there is no chance they gain a firm status in the country. Even the Northern Alliance, best fit to be a natural ally of the US, stated on numerous occasions, they were independent in their war against the Taliban. Clearly, they are keen to avoid being referred to as the external power's satellite. They state it now, when they do not enjoy major success in the war. What happens when the mutual enemy is defeated?

Another indirect confirmation of our vision of Afghanistan situation appeared a few days ago: a sensation the world has been waiting for - the American invasion of Afghanistan, of which the US media informed early last week - never happened. The experts note the US papers give so little facts about the latter, that it is nearly impossible to believe in the invasion's reality, or otherwise - its scale is so small, it's not worth discussing it seriously.
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